Dans cet article, les auteurs tracent l'historique de l'article 24 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur les droits des personnes handicapées et examinent ses conséquences sur les droits à l'égalité des personnes handicapées au regard de l'enseignement. Ils examinent tout particulièrement certaines décisions récentes faisant autorité dans le domaine comme Eaton, Auton, Wynberg et Moore pour attirer l'attention des défenseurs des droits des handicapés sur les stratégies susceptibles de renforcer les positions des handicapés. Bien que le tribunal n'ait pas retenu les arguments des défenseurs des droits des handicapés dans aucune de ces quatre causes, les auteurs proposent des façons dont l'article 24 pourrait faire pencher la balance en faveur des défenseurs des droits des handicapés.

I. INTRODUCTION
After several years of international negotiations instigated by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on December 19, 2001, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [CRPD] 1 entered into force on May 3, 2008 as the eighth major UN human rights treaty and the first of the In this paper, we consider how Article 24 of the CRPD, focused on education rights for people with disabilities, might be used to buttress legal arguments in two important areas: educational services required by children with autism and services required by children diagnosed with learning disabilities. Both issues have been litigated in Canada in recent years with disappointing results that we argue ought to be reversed. In Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v British Columbia (Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada held that the British Columbia government did not violate section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms when it failed to fund specialized treatment required by children with autism. 8 Similarly, in Wynberg v Ontario, the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal of a decision of a lower court that found a failure of the Ontario government to fund educational services for autistic children violated their Charter rights. 9 The majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Moore v British Columbia (Ministry of Education) recently upheld a decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court quashing a human rights tribunal decision which found that a failure to evaluate, monitor and fund special education services for students with learning disabilities violated their rights under the British Columbia Human Rights Code. We argue that the issues raised in all of these cases ought to be reconsidered in light of Canada's new obligations under the CRPD. 10 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada will soon have this opportunity as it has granted leave to appeal in Moore.
In Part II, we examine the background and framework of the CRPD and specifically the rights to education for people with disabilities contained in Article 24. In Part III, we review how international conventions apply within Canadian law as well as legal strategies to maximize their influence domestically. In Part IV, we explore recent Canadian jurisprudence in the area of education and disability rights. In Part V, we suggest how Article 24 might be used to buttress arguments in support of such rights in future cases. In Part VI, we provide brief concluding thoughts. 
II. THE LONG ROAD TO THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
A. Precursors to the Convention
Despite the fact that there are more than six hundred million people with disabilities worldwide, international human rights law has been slow to acknowledge disability as a human rights issue.
11 Just as many domestic legal systems have largely ignored disability rights until relatively recently, the use of international human rights instruments to address disability rights law is in its infancy. Historically, the marginalization of people with disabilities was regarded as a technical, medical issue that reflected personal problems to be resolved at the individual level. As other social movements, such as feminism, have politicized what were previously regarded as private troubles, 12 one has seen a dramatic paradigm shift in our understanding of disablement from the medical model, focused on changing the individual to better fit the existing environment, to the social model. 13 One of the earliest initiatives that marks a transition from the medical model to the social model was the 1971 General Assembly resolution, Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons.
14 This short resolution set out the rights of people with intellectual disabilities including their right to be treated the same as others, to the greatest extent possible. It also encompassed a right to medical care, rehabilitation, a preference for deinstitutionalization where feasible, and promoted economic security. 15 While the Declaration contained many qualifications to the rights enunciated therein, 16 it was nevertheless a landmark achievement at the time. A second example from that era is the 1975 General Assembly resolution, the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons. 17 This document stipulated certain basic rights for people with disabilities in general, including, inter alia, human dignity, economic security, and the right to secure and retain employment in accordance with their capabilities. 18 Both Declarations clearly, however, were soft 11 Quinn, supra note 2 at 89. 12 See e.g, Iris Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 72-73 (discussing how feminists had to create an entire language to voice concerns of sexual harassment). United Nations Human Rights <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/res2856.pdf>. We use the more contemporary term, people with intellectual disability, throughout this paper except in proper names of historical documents.
15
Ibid.
16
For instance, the Preamble indicated an awareness that certain developing countries could only direct limited resources toward people with intellectual disabilities. See ibid. Ibid.
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law instruments without any legal enforcement mechanism that simply advised states on the most appropriate conduct.
19
A turning point came with the United Nations' declaration of 1981 as the International Year of Disabled Persons [IYDP] that greatly increased awareness among policy makers around the world of the barriers faced by people with disabilities. The IYDP was also important in raising awareness of disability rights issues in Canada and encouraging inclusion of disability discrimination in section 15 of the Charter. 20 This was quickly followed by two more initiatives: the World Programme of Action for Persons with Disabilities [WPA] , that hoped to encourage national action plans to improve accessibility, and the UN Decade of Disabled Persons, 1983 Persons, -1992 . 21 This has also spawned a number of more recent events modeled on the UN Decade sponsored by regional international organizations such as the African Union, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and the Organization of American States. 22 Unfortunately, there was relatively little progress, leading some states such as Italy and Sweden to advocate a new international convention at various times in the late 1980s but bureaucratic inertia and a lack of consensus prevented the Italian and Swedish initiatives from moving forward immediately. 23 Instead, a new soft law regime was created in 1993: the UN Standard Rules for the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities. 24 The Standard Rules, a series of twenty-two guidelines, create soft law in a number of areas including employment, education, recreation and sports, and culture. They are divided into three principle sections: rules relating to the pre-conditions for equal participation, target areas for equal participation, and implementation measures.
25
A Special Rapporteur with a five-year renewable mandate was also appointed and has published a survey on the implementation of the Standard Rules. 26 Rule 6 specifically set out guidelines with respect to the education of children, youth and adults with disabilities. It mandates the integration of students with disabilities as a core component of national education planning, curriculum development and school organization. 27 It also mandates the provision of adequate support services to deal with the accommodation needs of students with disabilities, 28 and specifically states that parent groups and disability rights organizations should be involved at all levels. 29 Furthermore, it stipulates that special attention should be paid to three groups: very young children with disabilities, pre-school children with disabilities and adults with disabilities with a particular emphasis on women with disabilities. 30 At the same time, it does provide an exception authorizing segregated special education where the general school system does not adequately meet the needs of students with disabilities, but nevertheless encourages the gradual integration of special education services within mainstream educational programming. 31 Unfortunately, the non-enforceability of the Standard Rules again proved to stymie progress toward accessibility and led advocates, especially those influenced by the success of the Americans with Disabilities Act that was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1990, to urge the creation of a new international convention on disability rights. 32 In 1998, an expert group recommended that the Commission on Human Rights create a working group to address particular violations of disability rights and to consider the need for a new international agreement on disability rights. 33 A 2002 study demonstrated how only one General Comment, the 1994 General Comment 5 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, had been adopted specifically on human rights and disability rights by the various existing treaty monitoring bodies as of that date. 34 General Comment 5 analyzes how each ICESCR right applies to disability rights, 35 refers to the importance of the Standard Rules as a reference guide for delineating the responsibilities of State Parties, 36 and advocates for principles such as "independence, autonomy, and participation." 37 However, this General Comment was never mentioned in a sample of state reports under the ICESCR that were surveyed. 38 Typically, the commentaries contained in the reports of most of the treaty monitoring bodies ignored disability rights and seemed to articulate a medical model approach when it was mentioned. 39 The study recommended that a new treaty on disability rights be drafted because it would increase the visibility of disability rights issues and 
B. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
The CRPD reflects compromises necessitated by the conflicting visions of its drafters. Some disability rights activists who were actively lobbying for the convention would have preferred a full treaty modeled after the Convention on the Rights of the Child that goes beyond simply an anti-discrimination model. 44 Others would have preferred a very short document that could essentially amount to a protocol on disability appended to an existing convention. 45 Some developing countries were adamant that economic development was a precondition to providing accessibility for people with disabilities. On the other hand, some State Parties were equally insistent that obligations were confined to citizens of the signatory only. 46 In the end, a compromise proposal was selected: a hybrid convention that featured elements of each approach. The CRPD was drafted as a convention encompassing civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. 47 At the same time, the drafters were clear that no new rights were being created. Rather, accessibility would foster the ability of people with disabilities to access existing services. 48 Nevertheless, certain rights, such as Article 19, which stipulates a right to living independently and being included in the community, are unique to the CRPD. 49 the Convention that are immediately applicable according to international law. 53 At first glance, this might be regarded as a major limitation for the operationalization of rights under the CRPD whereby State Parties can plead poverty. However, the modifying clause that recognizes certain rights take effect immediately has relevance to our analysis below.
Some of the most important provisions relate to basic freedoms such as Article 10's right to life, Article 12's insistence of the equal recognition before the law for people with disabilities, and Article 14's liberty and security of the person. 54 Others concern socioeconomic rights such as the right to education detailed in Article 24 and the focus of this paper, Article 25 relating to health, Article 26 concerning habilitation and rehabilitation and Article 27 with respect to employment. 55 The definition of disability contained in the CRPD was a result of compromise. Many European State Parties and disability advocacy organizations believed that it would not be possible to reach an acceptable definition. 56 However, other activists, particularly the International Disability Caucus [IDC], a network of nearly one hundred international, regional and national organizations of people with disabilities that was influential in the final wording of the CRPD, 57 embraced the need for a definition of disability in the CRPD because national definitions were more restricted, but added the proviso of maintaining the option of no definition if the proposed ones were too narrow. 58 Ultimately, definitions of disability were addressed in the Preamble and in Article 1. The Preamble states that disability is an evolving concept and that it results from the interaction of persons with impairments, on the one hand, and attitudinal and environmental barriers on the other. 59 Article 1 states that "[p]ersons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others." 60 Collectively, the two provisions exemplify an understanding of the social model of disablement.
Article 24 sets out a series of rights for people with disabilities in education in five clauses. Education rights are fundamentally important because they allow people with disabilities to obtain the skills that will allow them to flourish in the workplace. In the past, many people with disabilities have been too frequently excluded from opportunities in employment, both because of barriers in the workplace and because of a relative lack of education compared to their able bodied counterparts. 61 Article 24 represents a thoughtful synthesis of two distinct philosophies. One school of thought is predicated on the idea that students with disabilities must be mainstreamed with their able-bodied peers because it is only through such interaction that substantive equality can be achieved. 63 The undergirding principle of equality is reinforced by the commitment to developing each disabled person's personality, talents and creativity as directed explicitly in Article 24(1)(b). 64 The provision specifically mandates in Article 24(2)(e) that State Parties provide environments that maximize academic and social development in keeping with the philosophy of "full inclusion." 65 We would suggest that the use of this language specifically acknowledges the commitment of the signatories to integration of students with disabilities in regular classrooms with peers of the same age. However, others, including some disability rights advocates and parents' groups, have suggested that at least in some contexts, the provision of services in separate settings can generate greater benefits for children with disabilities and that a true understanding of equality mandates separate education in some circumstances. 66 This can be seen by the language contained in Article 24(3)(c) which specifically states that the education of Deaf 67 and/or blind children may occur in separate settings. 68 In our view, Article 24 as a whole clearly mandates integration of students with disabilities, with very specific 62 CRPD, supra note 41 at Art. 24. Ibid at Art. 24(2)(e). Reasonable accommodation of students with disabilities is also required in Art. 24(2) (c). We use a capitalized Deaf to acknowledge that many Deaf people self-identify as a socio-cultural minority.
68
CRPD, supra note 41, at Art. 24(3) (c).
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and narrowly drawn exceptions. It represents an advance toward inclusion when compared to the language contained in Rule 6 of the UN Standard Rules.
69
However, international law developments are only beneficial if Canadian courts are able to apply them. We now turn to a discussion of how international conventions apply within Canadian law as well as legal strategies to maximize their influence.
III. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND CANADIAN LAW
As noted, on March 11, 2010 Canada ratified the CRPD. 70 Canada has neither signed nor ratified the Optional Protocol to the CRPD, which establishes an individual complaints process concerning perceived state violations of the treaty. Each of these elements of the interaction between international law obligations and Canadian law will be explored in turn. 
A. Customary International Law and Domestic Law
All elements of the CRPD which are also part of customary international law are automatically part of Canadian domestic law, even where implementing legislation is not present. This is because customary international law is regarded to be a part of the Canadian common law. 72 Parliament is free to modify Canadian law in deviation from customary international law (and the common law generally) but it must be express in its intention to do so. 73 Several substantive obligations found in the CRPD are already part of customary international law, such as the right to life (at CRPD Article 10) and the right to freedom from torture (Article 15).
74
Most important for the purposes of this paper is the customary international law right to basic education, 75 which the CRPD affirms (Article 24(2)(a)). If the CRPD's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability 76 is part of Canadian law, including as an implemented treaty obligation or an unimplemented but persuasive treaty obligation, this prohibition on discrimination arguably interacts with the customary international law right to basic education to ensure that the customary right to basic education is to be enjoyed by all persons, regardless of disabilities. Moreover, there exists a specific customary international law right to be free from discrimination in access to education, 77 although the CRPD marks the first time treaty language has specifically identified disability as a ground for such discrimination.
Parliament does not appear to have legislated in direct contravention of the customary right to basic education or to be free from discrimination in access to education. Those parts of CRPD Article 24 which correspond to the customary rights to basic education and to be free from discrimination are thus common law rights in Canada, enforceable within Canadian law unless legislation can be shown to be irreconcilably contrary to them.
B. Implemented Treaties and Domestic Law
Canada is a dualist rather than monist state in its approach to treaties and in order for international treaty law to be brought within Canadian domestic law, 
76
The CRPD prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability and obliges states to recognize the equality of all persons before the law. CRPD, supra note 41 at Art. 5
77
Beiter notes that non-discrimination in access to education is a customary international law right, although he does not address discrimination on the grounds of disability specifically. See Beiter, supra note 75 at 45-46.
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domestic Canadian law must be in force which serves as a conduit between the two systems and implements international law within the Canadian legal system.
78
There are at least two prominent rationales for the requirement of domestic implementation. First, one view holds that the executive's treaty-making power should be subject to final scrutiny by the legislature before internationally binding treaties are granted domestic effect. 79 Second, following the Labour Conventions case 80 implementing legislation is required in order to ensure that the provinces retain full jurisdiction over their areas of competence.
The precise legal procedures required for implementation are subject to debate, however. Simply put, the view of some courts is that explicit implementing legislation, which references or duplicates a treaty's contents, is a requirement for domestic treaty effect. 81 This formalist approach is not in conformity with actual implementation practice, however, since the domestic effect of treaties may take various forms, including pre-ratification legislation.
82 Furthermore, a formalist approach which requires explicit implementing legislation in all cases conflicts with the longstanding theory that implementation is only required where domestic legal authority does not already exist to permit performance of the treaty. 83 Canada's official declaration made when ratifying the CRPD in fact highlights how domestic implementation is not always achieved through explicit implementing legislation; when ratifying the CRPD, Canada expressed that "Canada interprets Article 33 (2) 84 Since Canada has only recently ratified the treaty there is no existing legislation which already explicitly implements the treaty. Canada's ratification statement thus suggests that implementation does not need to be achieved exclusively through explicit implementing legislation. Since existing mechanisms may already adequately implement the treaty, courts ought not to interpret a current lack of conspicuously labeled legislation (perhaps entitled "The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Implementation Act") to mean that the convention is unimplemented. Existing legislation should thus be reviewed for its adequacy in implementing the CRPD within Canadian law.
The memorandum tabled before the House of Commons prior to the ratification of the treaty 85 does not appear to express the intention of the current federal Government to introduce explicit implementing legislation which would apply to the treaty in its entirety, or at least to all subject matter provisions within federal competence. Specifically, the explanatory memorandum reads in part:
Obligations under the Convention relating to the right to equality and non-discrimination and to general protections of human rights and fundamental freedoms can be complied with through reliance on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Human Rights Act, and equivalent provincial and territorial legislation. Many obligations can also be complied with progressively through federal, provincial and territorial laws, policies and practices as they are developed over time.
At the federal level, specific obligations relating to promoting equality, dignity and an enabling environment for persons with disabilities can be complied with through additional existing federal legislation, policies, programs and practices. These include: consultations with persons with disabilities, awarenessraising measures, accessibility guidelines and standards, income support and tax measures, the Canada Social Transfer, support for victims of crime, the Employment Equity Act, etc. No changes to federal legislation or policy were identified as required for ratification.
86
If no explicit implementing legislation is passed, as appears to be the plan judging by the memorandum to Parliament, the question remains whether courts will view current Canadian law as being sufficient to give the treaty domestic effect. Canada's reference in its official ratification statement 87 to existing mechanisms as being a form of implementation, supports the idea that the treaty is domestically executed, in whole or in part, on the basis of existing Canadian law. 
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However, there is no guarantee that the majority of judges will accept that existing legislation implicitly implements the treaty within Canadian law, giving rise to the usual challenges and ambiguities of implicit implementation of human rights law as a Canadian practice. With respect to the right to education contained in the Convention, it remains to be seen whether Canadian provinces will pass explicit implementing legislation or otherwise alter the existing relevant domestic legal framework. Education is a provincial head of power and it is possible that the provincial governments could choose not to bring in new legislation in relation to the CRPD, instead taking the position that the educational rights of children with disabilities guaranteed by the Convention are covered under existing law. 88 However, existing legislative tools have not, as interpreted to date, always provided the legal basis for full educational rights for children with disabilities, and Canada's existing provincial laws must be scrutinized to determine the extent to which the treaty in fact has been implicitly implemented to date.
In sum, treaties which are ratified and are regarded by courts to have been implemented within Canadian law have an impact upon Canadian domestic law because such implementing legislation is directly applicable before the Canadian courts, and such courts will strive to interpret the implementing legislation in a manner consistent with the underlying treaty obligations. 89 The wording of Article 24 of the CRPD supports a comprehensive right to education; if the courts accept that this Article has been implemented, then disability rights advocates have a strengthened claim to a right to education.
It does not appear that recent legislation has been passed 90 federally or provincially which changes the legislative environment concerning the right to education of persons with disabilities from the laws which were in force at the time of Auton, Wynberg or Moore.
91 Since no post-ratification legislation is apparent that explicitly implements the education provisions of the CRPD, there is Auton, supra note 8; Wynberg, supra note 9; Moore, supra note 10. a risk that some courts will not look at the CRPD as profoundly changing through the convention's domestic implementation the rights of persons with disabilities to education. On the other hand, it is possible that courts will find that the existing legislative regime is indeed sufficient to implement the CRPD domestically. For instance, such courts may not require explicit implementation of the CRPD since they may note that such implementation is only required where existing domestic law cannot be interpreted as supporting performance of the treaty.
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C. Unimplemented Treaties and Domestic Law
Canadian courts have noted a presumption of compatibility between Canadian law and Canada's international legal obligations which they have a duty to enforce. 93 This presumption is applicable to ratified treaties despite questions with regard to their implementation status. For instance, in 1999 the Supreme Court in Baker 94 found the purportedly unimplemented Convention on the Rights of the Child to be highly persuasive in the interpretation of Canadian legislation, and established a precedent which regards ratified treaties to be influential before Canadian courts even without their having been implemented domestically. The interpretive presumption which holds that Parliament intends to legislate in compliance with Canada's international obligations thus applies to ratified treaties regardless of their perceived implementation status. Therefore, the CRPD, including Article 24, is now poised to influence courts' interpretation of Canadian legislation pertinent to the right to education since courts will interpret the relevant statutes in a manner consistent with Canada's obligations under the CRPD.
D. The CRPD and Charter Interpretation
In addition to affecting courts' interpretation of parliamentary intent in the passage of legislation, the CRPD is also set to influence courts' interpretation of the Charter, which may in turn shape court decisions in 99 This approach suggests that the CRPD's Article 24 provides a new basic benchmark for the right to be free from discrimination in access to education in Canada.
A second and quite different Supreme Court approach to the relationship between international legal obligations and the Charter is evident in the 2002 decision, Suresh. There, the Court held that international law could inform the Charter's content, but was not determinative, and furthermore held that in exceptional circumstances, the Charter may be interpreted in a fashion inconsistent with Canada's international human rights law obligations.
100
A spectrum of views to how the Charter relates to Canada's international human rights obligations is also evident in recent case law, 101 from decisions which allot considerable weight to international obligations (as in Health Services), to those which assign such obligations only optional influence (arguably seen in Suresh). It remains to be seen what approach to the relationship between the Charter and Canada's international obligations will gain prominence in the courts going forward.
E. Summary
With the ratification of the CRPD, Canada is now bound internationally to ensure compliance with obligations concerning the right to education outlined at Article 24. Canada's ratification of the CRPD will have an impact upon the Canadian law applicable to this right in four ways. First, with respect to customary international law, if the right to be free from discrimination generally, central to the treaty, is regarded as implemented within Canadian law, then this right to be free from discrimination ensures that persons with disabilities have the customary international law right to basic education that all other individuals hold, considering that this rule of customary international law (the right to education) has not been clearly deviated from in Canadian legislation. Furthermore, the Convention arguably affirms the customary international law right to be free from discrimination in access to education, including on the grounds of disability, a customary right that has not been clearly derogated from in domestic legislation, making it applicable within Canadian law. Second, Canada's ratification will have an impact upon Canadian law applicable to the rights of persons with disabilities to education to the extent that this treaty is regarded as implemented (either explicitly or implicitly, including by pre-existing legislation) within Canadian statute. In order to maximize the impact of the treaty on Canadian law through this mode, advocates should look for and highlight examples of legislation (and accompanying regulations) that domestically implement this treaty and its contents.
Third, this treaty's ratification will have an impact upon Canadian law to the extent that it frames the interpretation of existing legislation, according to the interpretive presumption which holds that Parliament intends to legislate in compliance with its international obligations. 102 In order to maximize its impact in this way, advocates may buttress the contents of the treaty text with further descriptive information concerning the intended scope of the rights contained in this treaty, including information from reports issued by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
103 This information will help guide courts in their interpretive reference to the Convention.
104
Fourth, it is possible that the CRPD, including Article 24, will influence courts' interpretation and application of the Charter in the future. At a minimum, Canada's obligations under the treaty may be taken into account by courts in their analysis of Charter contents. Advocates seeking to advance the right to education in Canada would do well to support the approach taken in Health Services, 105 which regarded Canada's international obligations as providing at least a basic threshold level of human rights protection enshrined within the Charter. According to this rationale, CRPD Article 24 provides a new minimum standard for the constitutionally protected right to education in Canada.
Thus, while a lack of explicit implementing legislation does create some ambiguity and uncertainty concerning the practical effects of Canada's ratification of the CRPD, it is clear that implementation alone is not the only method by which the treaty's ratification is poised to influence Canadian law and the right to education specifically, considering the persuasive interpretive value of unimplemented treaties as well as the influence of international obligations in shaping Charter analysis.
Even at its mildest influence -as an interpretative aid -the CRPD will make a significant impact on recent approaches to education rights of children diagnosed with autism and learning disabilities. The courts' restrictive approach in these cases thus far are explored in Part IV. 102 
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IV. RECENT CANADIAN CASE LAW ON EDUCATION RIGHTS AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
Children with disabilities, whether physical or intellectual, have historically been placed in segregated educational settings in Canada such as various training institutions for students with intellectual disabilities or crippled children's schools for students with mobility impairments. 106 Indeed, prior to 1980, school boards in Ontario were not required to accept a particular pupil at all if the educational authorities concluded she or he would not profit from an elementary education. 107 This compares unfavourably to the American regime where Congress mandated integration for pupils with disabilities in the least restrictive environment in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. 108 While the quality of education in segregated settings varied, they at best were not focused on providing academic skills but on correcting perceived deficits. 109 At worst, they were a pure example of the medical model engaged in degrading practices such as using school gymnasia for regularly scheduled medical examinations where students with disabilities were compelled to strip for group examinations that facilitated learning by medical students. 110 Such explicit and systematic regulation and surveillance of the disabled student's body in an educational context is strikingly similar to the regulation of prisoners famously analyzed by Michel Foucault. 111 Connor notes how, in fact, the special education system resembled Foucault's famous panoptical system of regulation: students with disabilities are regulated and observed by teachers, who in turn are regulated administrators who are governed by school boards who are governed by provincial ministries. 112 There is also clear evidence from American scholars that racialized working class youth have been far more likely to be labeled as having learning disabilities and placed in restrictive settings than their white middle class counterparts. 113 Eugenics as an ontological framework based on racial hierarchies and a phobia about the polluting influence of immigration, deeply influenced thinking in 106 See e.g. Sandra Goundry & Yvonne Peters, Litigating for Disability Equality Rights: The education philosophy in both the United States and Canada. 114 Finally, it is important to appreciate that special education systems have tended to evolve into bureaucracies which defend their own interests and are extremely resistant to change. This is not surprising because special education is premised on the notion that disability is pathological and needs to be fixed through objective scientific treatment that is determined through special education testing. 115 As Connor argues, in Foucauldian terms, the normalizing practices of schooling produce students with disabilities by labeling certain students as abnormal and pathological who must be corrected through scientific methods and closely monitored through testing.
116
Even when the Charter came into force and amendments to the various provincial human rights codes mandated inclusion of students with disabilities, school boards have not been pro-active in promoting equality and inclusion, leading to the phenomenon whereby students with disabilities have been merely tolerated: physically present in the integrated classroom but isolated, vulnerable to bullying and excluded from the social activities of the school. 117 A 2004 commentary states that more than forty percent of students with intellectual disabilities in Canada remain in segregated classes or schools. 118 Yet the topic has been sparsely addressed in Canadian law reviews, unlike the copious treatment in the United States. 119 The few authors to engage in this topic have sounded the alarm. While writing about the post-secondary educational context, for example, Hibbs and Pothier are stinging in their account of the provisions of accommodations for students with disabilities at the University of Victoria, a population at least in theory far better equipped to self-advocate for change than public school students. Hibbs and Pothier describe through a Foucauldian lens of disciplinary power how the university's policies are reactive and rigidly require documentation before services are provided. 120 These accounts suggest that there is a long way to go on this issue. 121 Emily Eaton was a child with cerebral palsy who primarily used a wheelchair, had some visual impairment, was unable to speak and who had no established method of communication.
122 Her parents challenged a decision of the school board's Identification, Placement and Review Committee (IPRC) that concluded, after a period of experimentation with integrated education, that she was more appropriately suited to special education classes. Her parents appealed to the Special Education Appeal Board which unanimously confirmed the decision of the IPRC. They then appealed this decision to the Special Education Tribunal which again unanimously confirmed the decision of the IPRC.
123
The Tribunal evaluated Emily's needs on a number of parameters including her intellectual and academic needs, her communication needs, emotional and social needs, physical and personal safety needs and her three years of experience as a student in an integrated setting. The Tribunal concluded that an integrated setting was not appropriate because the adapted curriculum was so different from that followed by the regular students that it merely served to isolate the student with intellectual disabilities. 124 Similarly, it found that Emily's communication needs required individualized and intensive attention that could only be provided in a segregated setting because she was not yet able to effectively communicate through Sign language. 125 It also found that there was little if any interaction between other pupils and Emily, although it acknowledged that it was difficult to determine Emily's reactions and possible emotional benefits given her communication difficulties. 126 The Tribunal also expressed concerns over Emily's tendency to place objects in her mouth as a potential safety issue. 127 Finally, the Tribunal concluded that the evidence indicated that Emily's intellectual, physical and emotional needs were not met in the years when she attended school in an integrated environment. 128 It therefore found no violation of the Ontario Human Rights Code or the Charter in the Board's decision to place Emily in a segregated setting, despite her parents' wishes to the contrary. 129 The parents then sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision and were unsuccessful in Divisional Court where the Court rejected the idea that the Charter created a presumption in favour of integration of students with disabilities. 130 However, the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed their appeal and set aside the Tribunal's order, finding a violation of section 15 of the Charter in the Education Act.
131 Arbour J.A., as she then was, ruled that s. 8 of the Education Act 132 should be read to include a direction that the least exclusionary option should be selected that provides an environment that can accommodate the student's needs, unless the parents consent to a segregated placement. 133 In her view, a segregated placement ought only to be considered as a last resort.
134
On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court allowed the school board's appeal and held that the decision of the Tribunal did not violate section 15. 135 The Court held that a presumption of integration would work to the disadvantage of those pupils for whom special educational settings is required in order for them to flourish. 136 The Court explained that it identified two purposes to s. 15's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability. First, it was to prohibit the attribution of untrue stereotypes relating to immutable characteristics. 137 Second, however, it stressed that reasonable accommodation may be required for some individuals to participate fully in society. 138 Therefore, it concluded that determining the best interests of the student with a disability should not be encumbered with a presumption in favour of integration. 139 In reaching this conclusion, enormously disappointing to many in the disability rights community and effectively setting a clear precedent that separate education constitutes equality under the Charter, 140 the Court did not consider any of the international agreements on disability rights then in force such as the Standard Rules.
141
Paradoxically, the Eatons subsequently placed their daughter in an integrated setting in the Catholic School Board system, even while seeking judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. 142 This underscores the capricious nature of decisions about integrating students with disabilities. Whatever the legal construction of Emily Eaton's impairments, in the real world, a school board was able to integrate her. 130 Ibid at ¶ 24-28. 131 141 See supra note 24, and accompanying text 142 Pothier, supra note 140 at ¶ 7.
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B. Auton
Although litigated as a matter of access to health services, Auton 143 is a key decision in disability and education rights jurisprudence. In Auton, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to consider whether section 15 of the Charter was violated by the British Columbia government's refusal to fund a specialized treatment known as Applied Behavioural Analysis or Intensive Behavioural Intervention [ABA-IBI] for pre-school autistic children. 144 Autism, or more accurately Autism Spectrum Disorder, is a neurological condition that affects communication and social interaction and causes repetitive behaviour. 145 The parents believed that this treatment was appropriate and beneficial for their children and sought funding. 146 The cost was considerable: between $45,000 and $60,000 per year due to its intensive nature. 147 They eventually sought a declaration that the failure to fund ABA-IBI treatment violated the equality guarantee in section15 of the Charter and could not be saved by section 1.
148
Although the Auton claimants characterized ABA-IBI treatment as a health service, it could equally be considered an educational service.
The trial judge held that ABA/IBI therapy was medically necessary for children with autism, and that the failure to fund the therapy in British Columbia, while funding other medically necessary services, violated the plaintiffs' equality rights pursuant to section 15. Justice Allen went on to conclude that this violation could not be saved by section 1 as universal health care was the prime objective and ordered the Crown to fund the ABA/IBI therapy for children with autism.
149
On appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment. The Court of Appeal found that the failure to fund the treatment to assist the complainants effectively created a "social handicap" that further marginalized an already disadvantaged group. 150 Moreover, this violation of section 15 was not justified under section 1 because there was neither a rational connection nor proportionality between the objective of the fair allocation of limited resources and the denial of ABA/IBI therapy to children with autism. 151 It allowed the parents'
143 Auton, supra note 8. 144 Ibid at ¶ 1-13. cross-appeal and added funding for ABA/IBI therapy pursuant to medical opinion.
152
Unfortunately for advocates of ABA/IBI therapy, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the lower courts and found that because ABA/IBI treatment was not a benefit provided under the law it was not subject to the equality analysis pursuant to section 15. 153 The Court held that the Canada Health Act 154 did not guarantee that all medically required services would be provided to Canadians. Rather, only core services were mandated and the remaining non-core services were up to the province's discretion. 155 It distinguished the Supreme Court's earlier ruling in Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), 156 a case about the funding of sign language interpreters for Deaf patients receiving physician care and maternity care, by observing that Eldridge concerned equal access to a benefit that was already conferred by law. 157 Consequently, there could be no administrative duty to distribute non-existent benefits equally. 158 Moreover, the Court went on to hold that even if ABA/IBI therapy were found to be a benefit provided by law, the claim would still fail because differential treatment was not demonstrated once the Court used the appropriate comparator group. 159 The Court held that the appropriate comparator group was neither able bodied children and their parents nor adults with psychiatric illness, as the petitioners suggested. Rather, the Court concluded that the appropriate comparator group was a non-disabled person or a person with a disability other than a mental disability seeking funding for a non-core therapy which is emerging and only recently becoming recognized as medically required. 160 Not surprisingly, when it analyzed the petitioners' claim in light of its extremely narrow comparator group, the Court found that there was no violation of section 15 as it concluded there was no evidence that the government acted differently with respect to the funding of other emerging therapies. 161 Again, the Supreme Court of Canada did not consider relevant international human rights law before dismissing the parents' claim. 160 Auton, supra note 8 at ¶ 49-55. 161 Ibid at ¶ 62. 162 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 163 Wynberg, supra note 9. A similar case involving educational services for children with autism that and the Education Act, 165 used an age cut-off of six years. 166 The trial judge held that the parents' equality rights under the Charter were violated on the basis of both age and disability and the violation could not be justified under s. 1. 167 The trial judge ordered declaratory relief and damages to the plaintiffs.
168
The Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the government's appeal and held that there was no Charter violation. The Court of Appeal applied the threepart test set out in Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 169 and focused on the dignity test. It concluded that most of the contextual factors suggested that there was no section 15 violation on the basis of age. 170 The Court held that there was simply no evidence to suggest that children with autism older than age six experienced greater stigma or discrimination than children younger than six. Moreover, the treatment in question appeared to be more effective when administered to children under six. 171 Even if there were a Charter violation, the Court of Appeal held that the age limit was rationally connected to some of the identified objectives of the IEIP, such as providing intensive behavioural intervention during a time horizon that experts regarded as providing the maximum benefits and allocating limited resources in a manner that optimizes outcomes for children with autism. It also only minimally impaired the rights of the claimants, especially given the Court's historic policy of deference to the legislature's choices in crafting complex distributive programs. 172 Therefore, there were no grounds for alleging discrimination on the basis of age.
With respect to disability discrimination, the Court of Appeal held that the claim must also fail because it was not at all clear that the requested behaviour 164 R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11. 165 Education Act, supra note 88, at s. 8(3). This provision requires the Minister to ensure all exceptional children have available to them special education programs and services and to ensure parents and guardians are able to appeal the appropriateness of the placement. 166 Wynberg, supra note 9 at ¶ 10-13.
Ibid at ¶ 10. 168 Ibid. 169 [1999] 1 SCR 497, [1999] SCJ No 12 [Law] . The test asks is the claimant accorded differential treatment under the law; second, is that treatment based on one of the prohibited grounds listed in s. 15(1) or a ground analogous to them; and third, does the differential treatment discriminate in a substantive sense. Four contextual factors used to evaluate whether a complainant's dignity has been harmed are (i) pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice or vulnerability; (ii) the correspondence, or lack thereof, between the grounds on which the claim is based and the actual needs, capacity or circumstances of the claimant or those he or she is properly compared to; (iii) the ameliorative purpose or effect of the impugned law, program or activity upon a more disadvantaged person or group in society; and (iv) the nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned governmental activity. 170 Wynberg, supra note 9 at ¶ 79-80. 171 Ibid at ¶ 52-59. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that children with autism over the age of six were denied the ability to acquire life skills, but held that the effect was relatively muted because the IEIP program was specifically tailored for children under six. See ibid at ¶ 75-77. 172 Ibid at ¶ 174-85.
interventions could feasibly be implemented within the regular school day. Ironically, the Court cited the fact that the IEIP guidelines require mastery of particular skills before integration of a student with autism is contemplated as inconsistent with Regulation 181/98 that requires school boards first consider integration in a regular classroom setting. 173 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial judge wrongly reversed the onus of proof that was the responsibility of the plaintiffs by holding that the IEIP was the only appropriate intervention for students with autism, given the lack of information available to parents on the efficacy of other treatment models. It also found that there was simply insufficient information about the experiences of students with other types of disabilities to do a proper comparator group analysis that is essential to reach a finding of discrimination.
174 As a result, the Court found that neither the claim of age discrimination nor disability discrimination could stand and allowed the appeal. Again, the Court of Appeal did not cite any international human rights law relating to disability rights. Unlike other cases considered in this article, Moore was not argued as a Charter case. The Tribunal had held that Jeffrey Moore, a child with dyslexia, was discriminated against because the school district and the Ministry failed to provide him with sufficiently intensive supports early enough for him to prosper as a student.
178 Early intervention and screening for children with learning disabilities and specific services such as phonemic awareness training typically result in dramatically greater academic success.
179 In Moore's case, he entered Grade 8 with a reading proficiency of children many years younger than him. 180 Second, the Tribunal had found that students with learning disabilities were systemically discriminated against by a decision to disproportionately cut funding to services required by students with severe learning disabilities. 181 Funding cuts resulted in the closure of a specialized program, known as DC1, in the plaintiff's district 173 Ibid at ¶ 122-27. The fact that this point seems to contradict the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in Eaton does not draw any analysis from the Court of Appeal. 174 Ibid at ¶ 128-46. The use of "typically developing students" as a comparator group was rejected. 175 See supra note 24, and accompanying text. 176 Moore, supra note 10. We disclose that Ravi Malhotra serves on the Human Rights Committee of The Court held that the Tribunal erred because it mischaracterized the service customarily available to the public at issue in the case as education services, rather than the provision of special education. 183 The Court engaged in a detailed analysis of Supreme Court Charter jurisprudence that it felt would be of relevance in determining the scope of the human rights claim. The Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was analogous to Auton rather than Eldridge. In other words, Moore was not completely denied access to services for students with learning disabilities. Rather, the claim was about the timing and quality of the specific services available to students with learning disabilities. Therefore, the service in question here was the provision of special education services, not education services generally as the Tribunal wrongly concluded. 184 Second, the trial judge found that the Tribunal erred in ignoring a comparative group analysis. 185 The Tribunal focused on whether Moore had been appropriately accommodated and not on engaging in a comparative group analysis. However, the Tribunal had held that, in the alternative, if a comparative group analysis was absolutely mandatory, it would compare Moore's services with those received by able-bodied students. 186 The Court, however, stressed the importance of a comparator group analysis. It concluded that the plaintiff simply failed to demonstrate that similarly situated students who require special education services were granted accommodations that the plaintiff was not.
187 Furthermore, as in Auton, the Court placed emphasis on the fact that during the long course of the litigation, there was simply not much existing research on the best practices with respect to students with learning disabilities.
188 Again, the Court did not consider international human rights law relating to disability in reaching its decision.
189
On appeal, the majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the B.C. Supreme Court in a short judgment. The majority found that the trial judge correctly concluded that the service customarily available to the public was, in fact, special education. 190 The majority also stressed that special education students such as Moore are not entitled to services at a standard of perfection, but merely a conscientious and reasonable effort to meet his needs. 191 While the majority 182 Ibid at ¶ 21, 24. While such services may seem to be counter to the social model narrative of inclusion of people with disabilities, it appears clear that the idea is to provide distinct specialized services so as to maximize the academic potential of students with learning disabilities in order to further long-term integration in society. 183 Ibid at ¶ 122. 184 Ibid at ¶ 90-122. 185 Ibid at ¶ 133 ("To find discrimination, there must first be a distinction drawn between the claimant and others. There must be substantial differential treatment between the claimant and a comparator group.") 186 Ibid at ¶ 125. 187 Ibid at ¶ 146-47. 188 Ibid at ¶ 8-14. The fact that the DC1 program was completely unique in the province did not assist the plaintiff's case. 189 See supra note 24, and accompanying text. 190 Moore, supra note 10 at ¶ 168. 191 Ibid at ¶ 177.
concluded that no further analysis was necessary, it went on to conclude that the trial judge was correct in analyzing the comparator group as other students with disabilities who require services.
192
In a lengthy dissent, Madam Justice Rowles held that the case ought to be analogized to Eldridge rather than Auton. Rowles J.A. reasoned that, in light of the Ministry of Education's own policy manual, accommodations relating to reading were simply services that enabled students with dyslexia to participate in educational programs generally. 193 She noted correctly that having an excessively narrow conception of the service makes it more difficult to demonstrate that a complainant has experienced discrimination. She asserted that this is inconsistent with principles of substantive equality that undergird human rights law in Canada.
194 Second, Rowles J.A. found that Auton could be distinguished with respect to the issue of comparator groups because it involved access to public benefit schemes. Where the accommodation is required to make the existing service at all accessible to a person with a disability, she held that it was appropriate to compare people with disabilities with able-bodied people.
195 She went on to conclude that the Tribunal had correctly determined that the School District had discriminated against Moore by cutting specialized services that he required because of his dyslexia and that this was in keeping with the vision of substantive equality that was required in Canadian human rights law. The fact that certain requested accommodations are novel in that they were not in effect in British Columbia schools does not automatically defeat the claim. 196 She noted the enormous lengths the Tribunal had gone to make its findings (10,000 pages of evidence).
197
Rowles J.A. also concluded that the Tribunal was correct in concluding that the School District, given the finding of discrimination against Moore, also systemically discriminated against students with severe learning disabilities by disproportionately cutting services to existing and future learning disabled students to address fiscal priorities, and by closing the DC1 program. 198 She found that keeping the DC1 program open would not constitute an undue hardship, notwithstanding the financial constraints faced by the district school board, because the evidence demonstrated that at least one discretionary program was shielded from cuts and the Tribunal noted that no analysis of the impact of the closure on students with severe learning disabilities was undertaken.
199 With respect to the liability of the Ministry, Rowles J.A. upheld the Tribunal's finding that both discrimination against Moore and systemic discrimination against students with learning disabilities occurred. 200 192 Ibid at ¶ 178-83. 193 Ibid at ¶ 94. 194 Ibid at ¶ 108. 195 Ibid at ¶ 117-21. 196 Ibid at ¶ 127-31. This makes eminent sense or else innovative accommodations could never be implemented. 197 Ibid at ¶ 129. 198 Ibid at ¶ 133-35. 199 Ibid at ¶ 143-53. 200 Ibid at ¶ 159-60.
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Once again, neither the majority nor the dissent in the Court of Appeal considered international human rights laws. Nor did the facta of either the complainant or the intervener, Council of Canadians with Disabilities, raise such arguments. 201 Clearly, these cases have been disappointments for disability rights advocates. They have applied formalistic reasoning to deny equality to people with disabilities. As we will argue in Part V, however, Article 24 of the CRPD can be used effectively to construct arguments that may transform the jurisprudence in this area to more closely reflect the values of equality and inclusion for people with disabilities.
V. APPLYING ARTICLE 24 OF THE CRPD: POTENTIAL STRATEGIES
As far back as 1987, shortly after the enactment of the Charter, MacKay and Krinke suggested that advocates of education rights and inclusion for students with intellectual disabilities should not restrict their arguments to statutory provisions. As they correctly observed, legislatures may well amend these statutes at any time and statutory frameworks gave the final say to bureaucratic administrators who may be hostile or insensitive to the needs of children with disabilities and their parents. Instead, such arguments needed to be grounded in human rights principles. 202 They explored philosophical arguments such as, inter alia, using social contract theory, the relationship between duties and rights requiring the state to offer inclusive education to students with disabilities in order that they may carry out their duties as citizens, or the practice of societal conventions as justifying education to establish the principle of inclusion for students with disabilities. 203 Although only mentioned briefly, Sussel and Manley-Casimir, also writing in 1987, allude to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of the Rights of the Child and the ICESCR in making the case for a moral commitment on behalf of the federal and provincial governments to provide every child with an appropriate education. 204 suggest how international law generally and the CRPD specifically might be used to bolster arguments in future cases. We argue that the holdings in Eaton, Auton, Wynberg and Moore are wrong when regarded through the prism of the values contained in the CRPD. In doing so, we embrace the notion of transnational judicial dialogue that suggests that there is a potential two way relationship between domestic courts and international human rights norms as embodied in conventions such as the CRPD. 206 Inspired by Law and Society scholars, this approach regards domestic courts and international law bodies as co-constitutive of a dynamic international law jurisprudence. 207 Waters identifies a three phase transnational legal process of interaction, interpretation and internalization by which domestic courts engage with international law to develop international legal norms. 208 While the cases reviewed here have mostly been inimical to the interests of people with disabilities, the dissent by Rowles J.A. in Moore 209 illustrates that a domestic decision can fruitfully push the interpretation of international disability rights law forward. But how might international disability rights law transform legal norms at the domestic level?
There are five possible arguments to be made. First, the holding in Eaton arguably is contradicted by both the letter and spirit of the emerging international disability rights law. As we noted above, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Eaton that there was to be no presumption in favour of integrating students with disabilities. Rather, courts, tribunals and school boards would assess the individual merits of each case. 210 As Dianne Pothier has noted, this is highly problematic because if segregated education is a better choice for the student with a disability simply because of the inadequate supports available in the integrated classroom, then both environments have failed the student with a disability. 211 Moreover, there is great risk of ignorance and prejudice undermining opportunities for children with disabilities. Research suggests that educators often equate physical disabilities with learning or intellectual disabilities so that there is a presumption that a child with physical disabilities also has some kind of intellectual disability. 212 
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education may be warranted by State Parties, 214 the overall thrust is clearly in favour of integration. Therefore, in future litigation on integrating students with disabilities, advocates for either plaintiffs or interveners could argue persuasively that Article 24 mandates a policy of inclusion. This is in keeping with the values articulated in the public sphere by many advocates, both in Canada and internationally. Thus, Autism Europe, The Arc, and the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities all embrace a position of inclusion where students with intellectual disabilities receive education with able-bodied students. 215 Second, we noted earlier that in order to instantiate international disability rights law, it would be best to identify existing legislation or other laws that may be regarded as implementing international disability law principles. 216 In addition to highlighting the extent to which the treaty has been implemented within Canadian law, we noted that even unimplemented (but ratified) treaties hold persuasive value before the courts, since statutes are to be interpreted in a manner consistent with Canada's international obligations. 217 It is very likely that customary international law also supports the recognition of the right to education of persons with disabilities, since the right to education is undoubtedly part of customary international law, and is thus part of the common law of Canada. Finally, we noted that Canada's international human rights obligations are relevant to the interpreted scope of the Charter and may provide a minimum threshold of guaranteed rights. 218 Third, while disability rights advocates should certainly press for the adoption of the position that a right to full inclusion for children with disabilities in integrated settings currently constitutes customary international law, and also stress the presumption of statutory compliance with Canada's international obligations, there remain strong arguments that the CRPD has been implemented within Canadian domestic law. By referencing specific provisions in domestic statutes that provide evidence that implementation of the CRPD in international law, the binding nature of the CRPD is strengthened. For instance, in British Columbia, Ministerial Order 150/89, also known as the Special Needs Student Order and enacted pursuant to the School Act, 219 states in part:
A board must provide a student with special needs with an educational program in a classroom where that student is integrated with other students who do not have special needs 214 Ibid at Art. 24(3)(c). These exceptions relate primarily to the education of Deaf and/or blind children. 215 See Autism Europe, "Autism and Inclusion" in Ziegler, supra note 2, 43 at 43-45; The Arc and the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, "Position Statement on Inclusion", in Ziegler, supra note 2, 46 at 46-48. The precise details vary and the European advocates make allowances for segregated settings in the case of certain individuals. The Arc is a community organization promoting supports and services for people with intellectual disabilities. 216 unless the educational needs of the student with special needs or other students indicate that the educational program for the student with special needs should be provided otherwise. 220 Similarly, Ontario Regulation 181/98, passed pursuant to the Education Act, 221 states at s. 17 that the Identification, Placement and Review Committee shall consider placing students in a regular classroom with special education services first before exploring segregated options. 222 Such regulations provide evidence of a commitment on the part of governments to integration in keeping with the principles of Article 24 of the CRPD. Statutory regulations reflect the considered view of the legislative assembly and ought to be accorded due weight when interpreting Canada's compliance with its international law responsibilities.
Fourth, one may wish to revisit decisions such as Auton in light of Article 24. In Auton, the Supreme Court of Canada held that ABA/IBI therapy was not a benefit conferred by law and therefore there was no Charter violation in the British Columbia government's decision not to fund the therapy as part of its publicly funded health care services. 223 To the extent that Article 24 mandates full inclusion of people with autism, the lack of funding for services, whether they are characterized as a health issue (Auton) or as an educational issue (Wynberg) , is deeply troubling. We submit that these cases were wrongly decided. As Martha Jackman has pointed out, the Supreme Court's reasons in Auton distinguish sharply between the principle of universality, or coverage for core medical services to all Canadians, and comprehensiveness, or the extent to which particular services are covered. 224 While courts are willing to intervene to defend universality once the legislative branch has reached an agreement with the respective provincial medical association that deems a particular service as covered, the issue of what will be deemed a core service, comprehensiveness, is essentially being placed beyond Charter review. 225 Yet the trial judge in Auton who found in favour of the plaintiffs clearly noted that there was a relationship between the timely provision of the therapy and the long term educational flourishing of children with autism that might avoid the need for costly as well as isolating institutionalization. 226 Such findings of fact are crucial when relying on Article 24. Establishing a nexus between the requested therapy and education performance increases the legitimacy of Article 24 by operationalizing the language in ways that will make sense to judges and counsel.
A fifth issue that must be addressed is the misuse of comparator group analysis to defeat equality claims for people with disabilities. The dysfunctionality of comparator group analysis, which has become central and essential in adjudicating such claims, and its pernicious effects have been noted in the legal literature Furthermore, Article 24 assists arguments maintaining that rigid comparator group analysis simply re-introduces the long discredited "similarly situated" test. 233 In their intervener factum submitted to the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Moore, the Council of Canadians with Disabilities maintained that the duty to accommodate inherently entails a comparative analysis because of the individualized nature of disability accommodations. The comparison is inevitably between people with disabilities and able-bodied people. 234 No two children with disabilities are identical. Jessica might have a diagnosis of cerebral palsy and walk with a limp, have no learning disabilities and excel in all subjects such that she is academically competitive with her able-bodied peers. Erica might also have a diagnosis of cerebral palsy, use a power wheelchair, require attendant services for eating, dressing and toileting as well as significant academic accommodations for learning disabilities and also have speech impairments requiring the use of alternative communication systems. Each will require individualized accommodations. Consequently, there is no need to encumber disability accommodation cases with an artificial comparator group analysis. 235 We agree and maintain that Article 24(2) (c)'s requirement for reasonable accommodation bolsters the warranted critique of unduly formalistic comparator group analysis.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In this paper we have tried to illustrate the importance of Article 24 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for current policy issues in disability law. The drafting, signing and ratification of the CRPD took many years of tireless advocacy by people with disabilities and their organizations in a number of countries around the world to become international human rights law. It is likely that it will take many more years before judges and counsel become conversant with its intricacies and arguments regarding implementation are more readily accepted. The reports of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities should offer a rich source of material that counsel can shape into effective advocacy. Article 24 and the CRPD more broadly can provide an effective tool kit to further legal arguments relating to the lack of presumption of integration for children with disabilities and to the flaws of comparator group analysis. At a time when the Supreme Court has largely taken a troubling turn toward more formalistic reasoning, Article 24 provides another avenue of support for advocates, enriches our arguments, and thereby promotes social justice for people with disabilities. 233 The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the "similarly situated" test in Andrews v Law Society (British Columbia), [1989] 1 SCR 143, [1989] SCJ No 6 at ¶ 25-30. 234 CCD, supra note 176 at ¶ 34-37. 235 Ibid at ¶ 34.
